The past several months have witnessed profound transformations in the state of America’s economic outlook. Output growth has accelerated, with annualized GDP growth rates of 4.6%, 5.0%, and 2.2% in Q2, Q3, and Q4 of 2014, respectively. This has been accompanied by similarly impressive gains in the pace of job creation, with a full year’s worth of monthly net employment gains of over 200,000, and an unemployment rate increasingly dipping into “natural rate” territory (estimated to be between 5.2 & 5.5%, though recently revised to around 5.1%). Oil prices have plunged since late 2014, helping to spur aggregate demand. And the FY 2016 budget released by the Obama administration in early February continued the turnaround in federal fiscal policy, with large increases in proposed discretionary spending initiatives promising to accelerate (if implemented) the transition towards a more accomodative policy stance.
All of this points towards an economy that is rapidly strengthening and should continue to do so as the year continues. The impacts of oil & natural gas price declines have yet to fully ripple through the economy in the form of increased manufacturing competitiveness and higher consumption. Firming employment figures should boost aggregate demand as more earnings are recycled into discretionary household purchases. Higher stock and housing prices will continue to translate into “wealth-effect” consumer spending. And rising retail sales should further spur investment, boosting current and long-run growth in the process. Ceteris paribus – all else held equal (such as geopolitical happenings) – and there is little reason to expect for strong economic growth not to continue.
With the arrival of Spring on March 20th and the accompanying wave of household cleaning, as well as this unexpected barrage of good economic news, it is a good time to take stock of the current policy trajectory. Considering it is in the news so much, and bears so much direct import on the macroeconomy, of primary concern is the stance of monetary policy. How soon should the Fed tighten?
Currently, the main policy tool that is modulated by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Funds Target Rate, is set in a range from 0 – 0.25% – the lowest levels in its history. This has been the case since late 2008, and the 6+ years since then has likewise marked the longest period of accomodative policy in history.
This is set to change.
Rumor has it that a long-awaited hike in interest rates (read: Fed Funds Target Rate) will proceed by the middle to late-middle of this year, though the rate of increase will be fairly gradual, perhaps around 50 basis points to .75% by late this year. This has been the assumption of investors for awhile now, and seems to be the likeliest course of action. But is it a good course of action?
My views are mixed, but side with pessimists who feel that even these gradual steps are too rapid. First among my concerns is that the American economy is still no where close to “full employment”, one of the key elements of the Fed’s dual mandate. The Economic Policy Institute estimates that U3 rates closer to 4.0% (instead of 5 – 5.5%) are more consistent with NAIRU (n0n-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). This would make sense, for though unemployment is now within reach of the Fed’s estimates for NAIRU, inflation has continued to trend down (turning into outright deflation in recent months as lower oil prices feed into general prices), and wage growth remains stagnant (at 2% nominal growth, real wage growth is too low to feed into wage-push inflation).
We would expect wage growth to strengthen as we near the natural full rate of unemployment. Rising demand for workers while the labor supply becomes more scarce boosts the bargaining power of workers to negotiate higher wages. This wage growth is partially a pre-requisite for higher rates of inflation (closer to the 2% target). Higher wages means that prices usually must be increased for businesses to maintain profits, and these higher prices then necessitate further wage hikes, creating a positive upward spiral that feeds into rising inflation. Since both nominal wage growth and inflation rates are well below target, it appears that full employment has not yet been reached.
Some will argue that the existence of monetary policy impact lags (how long it takes for a policy change to have an effect) would justify a rate increase now, as several months from now, it may well be that full employment is reached and wage and price increases are accelerating, to the point that tighter policy is needed to mitigate. However, even if it were so that we reach full employment on current trajectory (which, if EPI is right and NAIRU is closer to 4.0%, will be a ways into the future), I still think holding off on an increase is justifiable. For one thing, wage growth has been subpar for many years – allowing it to catch up back to pre-recession trends wouldn’t be a bad idea. This is especially true if the Fed is worried about the sustainability of the expansion. Wage increases are necessary for increases in consumer spending (the driving force of the U.S. economy) to be sustained. Allowing for months, if not a few years, of above-average wage & inflation growth might not be a bad thing for the sake of sustainability.
Given the existence of multiple tools to combat inflationary pressures and to prevent higher inflation rates from being too ingrained, I think the biggest drawback of this proposal of delayed tightening is that the Fed risks overshooting its employment target (meaning that unemployment is below its natural rate for an extended period of time). Technically, this would be a violation of its dual mandate. However, invoking the argument about this policy helping to produce long-run economic sustainability (to maintain full employment and stable prices), a temporary overshooting of the dual mandate targets might be statutorily justified. It all depends on the timeframe the Fed chooses to create policy, which historically has been rather short (within months/a few years). This is the difficult balancing act the Fed must consider, and which is statutorily ambiguous.
If it were to think more of the possible long-run consequences of its policies (especially as it relates to the dual mandate), an already difficult task suddenly becomes much, much more complex. Further thinking and a cleaning of its future policy stance is in order…