Caught Between Iraq and a Hard Place

Just a few years ago, things were looking up for the Middle East.  The Arab Spring , in which peoples across the region rose up to overturn oppressive and authoritarian governments (many of them dictatorships), spread like wildfires in 2011 and 2012 across the region, raising the prospects of the establishment of liberal democratic institutions.  World oil prices, having plunged during the Great Recession (with some indices reaching a low of approximately $30/barrel in late 2008 and early 2009), rebounded sharply as the aughts came to a close, propping up the region’s oil-dependent economy.  After a brief conflict with Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict grew quieter, and there existed emerging optimism that American-led interventions would finally be drawing to a close.

What a difference a few years can make.  The Arab Spring has collapsed, having produced only one quasi-legitimate democracy (Tunisia).  Many authoritarian governments remain intact, and even the ones that were overthrown (such as the regime of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak) were replaced by illiberal “democracies” that have since slid back towards authoritarian tendencies (or outright coup d’états).  Oil prices gains have stalled, having yet to reach their mid-2008 peak, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has yet again reared its ugly head.

Of the many fires now consuming the region, however, none are quite as disheartening as the disintegration of Iraq.  The steady march of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) across much of northern and central Iraq has caused horrific casualties and undermined the already struggling legitimacy of the regime in Baghdad (which has pretty much collapsed with Nouri al-Maliki’s resignation on August 14th, 2014) .  That this follows a multi-trillion dollar 9-year American-led war there, whose purported objectives was to establish a peaceful, legitimate Iraqi liberal democracy, makes this disintegration especially galling.

Barely two and a half years after pulling out the last American troops there, the US is (according to yet again contemplating sending in troops of some form or another, mainly to help save the minority Yazidi population currently trapped by the IS.  The decision as to whether to pursue further intervention into the broader conflict, however, is muddied by a few complicated factors:

  • Who exactly are the “good guys” and “bad guys” here?  This seems like a ridiculous question, especially considering the horrific brutality of IS tactics and the fanatical ideology they espouse.  However, just as in the Syrian Civil War, the existing alternatives to IS rule (including the pre-IS status quo) aren’t exactly ideal either.  Indeed, the (now nonexistent) Shia-dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki has reportedly continued to persecute Iraq’s Sunni minority, and has not formed a government representative or inclusive of Sunnis.  While most Sunnis do not appear to favor IS either, many are frustrated with the regime in Baghdad.  If the US intervenes in support of the Iraqi government, it would be doing this with full knowledge that it, like the IS, has also committed many abuses.  A choice has to be made between the lesser of two evils – you really can’t win here.
  • The IS is providing needed social services to many Iraqis.  According to PBS, the IS has established and funded a variety of social services to much of the population in its territorial control.  While this is obviously a tactic to buy-off the population and garner support, it does provide a modicum of short-term human security (and thus, potentially, stability).  Also, some services, such as healthcare, education, power, and water, etc.  have the potential to promote economic development and diversification (and thus long-run stability), although whether growth & development or quality services come first is admittedly a longstanding chicken-and-egg controversy in the economics profession.  Diversification, especially, is key to long-term economic prosperity in Iraq, which still disproportionately relies on oil production to generate wealth and to provide fiscal resources.  Such dependency reflects a classic case of the resource curse, whereby the resource at hand (in this case, oil) stunts development in the long run by appreciating the currency and making industrial exports uncompetitive.  Thus, ironically, the IS could be indirectly (and inadvertently) promoting the long-run social and economic well-being of the country via its provision of these services, and efforts to stop it could do the opposite.  Of course, this ignores the profound violence and economic disruption caused by the IS, not to mention the groups’ many other non-negligible negative qualities.  But it is something to consider by the Americans and the Iraqi state (and other involved actors) as they consider how to move forward.  Perhaps a reshuffling of Iraqi budgetary priorities is in order?
  • Substantial American opposition to US military intervention.  Simply put, Americans are really, really war-weary.  They are tired of the very real human and financial costs of war, and feel like Iraq (among other interventions) is a hopeless basket case that should just solve its own problems.  The difficulty that Barack Obama and the American government faces is the conflict between pragmatic action (which, given the uncertainty and number of variables involved, has yet to be defined) and appeasing the electorate (mostly for the sake of his party, as he is no longer eligible for reelection, although presidential legacy is always an influencing factor as well).
  • Would US intervention help or hurt Iraqi, American, and global interests?   What exactly are those interests in the first place?  These questions are very, very broad.  First, it must be asked which Iraqi domestic scenario is in the interests of the Iraqi people.  A Shia-dominated government?  A Sunni government?  A mixed government?  State partition?  Some have even questioned, especially since the Iraq war, whether democracy is even in Iraq’s best interest at this time, considering cultural factors and lack of established democratic precedent in the country.  This relates to the debate as to whether growth and form of government are best compatible, and which should be emphasized first.  For America and the globe, there are questions as to whether a certain Iraqi domestic situation is best for regional stability, especially when it comes to providing a counterbalance to the hostile Shia-dominated government of Iran.  How about oil price stability?  Since the commodity price surge of the 2000s, the global economy has certainly adjusted to higher prices and more prepared for price shocks via structural efficiency gains (note that the Great Recession was preceded by an oil price shock in which prices exceeded $100/barrel; prices have since consistently been around $100/barrel, and yet global growth has long since resumed).  Thus, conflict in Iraq might not be as much of an economic red flag as it once was.  But it still is important.  Considering all of these different questions (a non-exhaustive list which has been provided here),  it then has to be determined whether American military intervention of any form would help or hurt all of those interests.

Personally, I have no concrete opinion as to what course of action I think should be pursued.  Like so many subjects in the realm of public policy, each action has its costs and benefits, the net effect of which is extremely difficult to ascertain.  Literally millions, if not billions, of variables are at play here.  Yet in the end, a choice must be made by America’s leaders, even if that choice is ultimately to do nothing.  Regardless of what they choose, they can be assured to face unflinching judgement by millions of people with an understandable yet fatally simplistic view of the world who, like the rest of humanity, are limited in the amount and scope of information available to them.  That is the unfortunate reality of politics – a reality that, in this case, is further exacerbated by the life-and-death nature of the situation. It is an unenviable position for any policymaker to be in.  Invoking the old phrase, they are truly caught – caught between a rock and a hard place.


Finding Balance in U.S. Foreign Policy

Finding the “right” foreign policy mix is never easy for the typical nation.  Each must weigh the national interest, resource availability, power relations & hierarchy, ethics, and the global common good, to name a few considerations.  Unfortunately for America, however, these considerations are, in some ways, far more difficult for it to answer, and much more complex than the decisions others face.  For America is not the typical nation.

Indeed, since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, America has found itself in the somewhat awkward position of being the world’s last remaining superpower.  Even today, despite the rise of China and other emerging nations, the United States by far retains the world’s largest economy in absolute terms, and a military might (and budget) that dwarfs any other.  This has undoubtedly brought multiple benefits – vast geopolitical influence, favorable terms of trade, cultural hegemony, etc.  Being as it is at the top of the world system, however, it has also evoked intense scrutiny and criticism of its behavior.  For the world expects, in return for the benefits of unipolar hegemony, certain services in return, namely international security (especially for trade routes), a respect for sovereignty, economic and non-economic aid, and a respect and maintenance of international institutions, agreements, and norms.  Since the end of World War 2, this American-led and American-arranged world system has existed, and has been remarkably successful.  Since 1945, no global wars have occurred, inter-state peace has been (for the most part) maintained,  and new phases of globalization and free trade have flourished, benefiting both America and participants in the world system.

With the collapse of its political, ideological, and economic rival in 1991, however, and with no other country anywhere near matching America in its economic and military clout, the last 20 years have placed new strains on this American-led world system.  Whereas before the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the U.S. helped in some ways to restrain the other, now there was virtually no one to restrain the one remaining superpower.  Although America has, in my opinion, used its unique position to benefit the world on net (not only since 1991 but since the world system came into being in 1945), it still has been difficult for it to strike a good balance between restraint and the need to be assertive on the world stage.

Take, for example, America’s behavior following 9/11.  Up until that terrible event, American military spending and aggressiveness had been on decline.  This was due in part to the Cold War’s end, which meant that much related spending could be unwound.  Additionally, finding itself as the new unipole, and perhaps not wishing to abuse that status, America decided to ease any interventionist impulses (UN-related mishaps in Somalia in 1993 didn’t help).  No doubt, also, that the unique characteristics of America’s government at the time – a domestic-focused Democratic president and budget-conscious Republican Congresses – helped to shape the retrenchment of the 90s.  9/11 quickly changed all of that, and an “offense is the best defense” strategy soon prevailed, no doubt shaped by the unique neoconservative influence of the Bush Administration.  Defense spending surged, and because the 9/11 attacks came from non-state actors that tended to reside in states that “harbored” them, a new focus on militarily intervening in hostile and/or unstable states emerged.  The resultant wars in Afghanistan and (especially) Iraq that began not long after 9/11 have since provoked furious debate as to their necessity and “legality” within the world system.  Was America fulfilling its duties to maintain long-term global stability and acting according to its sovereign right to defend itself?  Or was this an imperial overstretch in which America attempted to impose its will on others?

Perhaps the answer is both, and when one takes a look at the considerations facing policymakers at the time, in some ways America’s actions look quite rational.  First of all, Afghanistan was harboring al Qaeda (the group responsible for 9/11), who needed to be rooted out to prevent future attacks.  Second, to help further prevent terrorist attacks, some “nation-building” of Afghanistan was required.  All of these could be said to benefit both the US and the world (at least theoretically speaking – for actual results, that’s a whole other matter ). Following 9/11, Afghanistan therefore seemed like a reasonable place to intervene.

But why Iraq?  After all, Iraq had no direct connections with al Qaeda, and it certainly wasn’t the only other hostile state in the world at the time (e.g. Iran, North Korea, etc.)  The original rationale, because Iraq was thought by several nations to have WMDs, doesn’t exactly explain why the U.S. decided to intervene solely there, as other hostile nations had or were attempting to gain WMDs.  Nor does the need to bring “democracy” and “freedom” – again, if that were really a main consideration, then the United States should have intervened in a significant portion of the world that lacks those criteria.  No, I think the real reasons are a blending of the following:

a) America badly needed to (or thought it needed to) project power into the Middle East to show that it was in control of the world system following 9/11.  Why the Middle East?  Because, it generally is the region where Islamic terrorism originated and where the ideology is fomented (though certainly not the only region of the world).  In this way, its invasion of Iraq was actually a quasi-response to 9/11.

b) Iraq had repeatedly been uncooperative with UN weapons inspections throughout the 1990s, and that (combined with past use of WMDs, such as using chemical weapons during the 1980s) violated international norms.  In a way, America was punishing noncompliance to international norms and a respect for international security, though ironically in some ways it did so by violating established international norms (e.g. going forth with the invasion of Iraq without UN authorization).  This punishment could also be seen as a message for other regimes (like Iran and North Korea) to get their act together (this arguably worked somewhat as intended, for at least the Libyan regime gave up its WMD pursuits following the 2003 invasion of Iraq).

c) Plans for regime change had long been discussed and advocated by people within both the Clinton and Bush administrations, as Saddam’s regime was widely perceived as a threat.  Failure to remove him from power during the Gulf war was seen as a weakness for the United States.  Since 9/11 was also seen as a moment of weakness, this was the perfect time to demonstrate that America had power and would “get the job done”.  Rahm Emanel’s “never let a crisis go to waste” statement naturally comes to mind.

d) Rightly or wrongly, Iraq (along with Afghanistan) was seen as an opportunity to spread democracy and other American values, arguably to help better maintain world security (refer to the democratic peace theory).

Clearly, these are rational reasons for America’s turn towards interventionism, which can arguably be said to help maintain both the global system and secure American interests (both of which are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts).  Then again, many of America’s actions (in Iraq especially) seemed unrestrained and negligent.  For example, in the post-invasion phase, Paul Bremer made serious errors as leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority (e.g. basically temporary governor of Iraq).  He unilaterally abolished the Iraqi military, initiated a “De-Ba’athification” program that rooted out Ba’ath Party influences, and failed to hand over sovereignty and self-governance to the Iraqis quickly.  These quasi-totalitarian actions (and lack of action) not only looked like an overreach, but they directly contributed to the insurgency and instability in the years following the invasion, an instability that threatened to cause wider instability in the international arena. An even wider question is whether Iraqi culture is even compatible with democracy.  Was it being imposed?  Was it right for them?

I think America had both maintenance of of the world system, self interest, and, perhaps, some quasi-imperialistic ambitions in mind when it comes to Iraq.  By imperialistic, I don’t necessarily mean creating a colony or subjugating the Iraqis to American rule in the long-run.  I do mean, however, an attempt to impose American-style governance and values in the naive belief that this could only enhance American and world security.  And in the post-9/11 environment, we felt justified in being so bold, seeing it as necessary to preserve our image as leader of the world system.  Imposing American values and maintaining a secure international order  (including America’s position at the top) became one in the same to us.  Regardless of our intentions, however, it is unclear whether intervention in Iraq can ultimately be said to have benefited either America or the world.  While a hostile regime was removed, its replacement by a “democratic” Shi’a regime makes it vulnerable to Iranian influence, and Saddam’s fall removed a check to Iranian behavior.  The conflict was very costly in terms of lives and finances.  Additionally, our negligent actions and non-actions post-invasion ironically have arguably made Iraq a new breeding ground for terrorists, making us worse off security-wise.  Only time will tell what becomes of Iraq.

The shift away from overreach began during the remainder of the Bush administration and has continued into the Obama presidency, regardless of various troop “surges”.  Iraqi sovereignty returned to them slowly, and a recognition that costly military intervention must be followed by costly  post-invasion nation building (lest the world system be more threatened than before invasion) has caused the United States to adopt a policy of “selective engagement” during the Obama years, with the least amount of military intervention as possible.  The problem is, the pendulum risks swinging much too far towards non-interventionism and non-assertiveness, depriving the world of proper American leadership and a fulfillment of its hegemonic duty as implicit maintainer of world security.  Inaction following Syria’s breach of Obama’s vague “red line” and an unwillingness for any military presence in Iraq or Afghanistan (despite continued internal security concerns) undermines the United States’ credibility, its position as hegemon, and threatens the security of the world system it maintains.  In some ways, I think too much emphasis is being placed on diplomacy.

Like the 1990s, military spending and aggressiveness are again on the decline.  But surely, the pendulum will swing back, perhaps this time to help address the rise of China, or just generally to correct for too much retrenchment in the late 2000s-present.  Regardless of America’s actions, China’s rise will surely disrupt or even upend the world system that has existed since the end of World War 2.  The considerations America has faced during its “unipolar moment” since the 1990s have been uniquely complex.  Now, with the construct of the entire world system shifting, striking a good foreign policy balance will be more difficult than ever before.


The Next Phase of Political Globalization

This is just one of many topics I’ve been thinking about lately (the theme generally varies randomly day by day), and I’m hardly the first person to address it, but I would like to note that I think the world has begun to to enter another, accelerated phase of “political globalization” over the past couple of years.  By political globalization, I mean an integration and synchronization of governmental policies, state sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and boundaries.  However, I’m not exactly talking about a “one world government” or “world state”, at least not yet.  Rather, I think political globalization will first happen in fragmented and regional segments.  Since they tend to share many similarities, it would make sense for regions to be the first level to experiment with an integration and synchronization of the functions of individual member states.

It is hard to deny that political globalization has already happened to an extent, largely as a direct result of waves of economic integration that have made the happenings in one economy quite significant to the performance of another.  As the globe has unified into regional economic blocks or as one cohesive unit, there has been significant pressure to coordinate the policies (especially the economic policies) of individual states. This can be clearly seen in the the case of Europe.  It is widely agreed that the southern “periphery” region near the Mediterranean will continue to pull down European growth overall until wages there are pulled back in line with productivity.  Until that happens, however, many have urged the economically stronger “north” to consume more and for governmental fiscal policies to become expansionary to prop up demand in Europe overall until the periphery regains strength.  This has been resisted thus far, especially by a cautious Germany that still bares the scars of its hyper-inflationary episode in 1920s Wiemar Republic.  However, as European recovery continues to languish, pressure continues to build for the north to not only step up but for a “fiscal union” to be created to complement the existing monetary union.  European nations have already given up much sovereignty when joining the European Union (EU); it seems ever more likely that further losses in sovereignty are necessary to preserve the union.

This convergence of policies will not be confined to Europe, however.  Rather, the economic globalization of the past few centuries has transformed many economies into one, though they continue to be impacted by many often contradictory policies and politics.  The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated the need for further political globalization to occur; the United States “sneezed” and the rest of the world caught a cold, resulting in several international conferences that called for a global implementation of Keynesian-style fiscal stimulus across several states to quickly re-inject falling economic demand.  After the crisis faded, industrialized nations further realized that a coordinated revamping of financial regulations, including new minimum reserve requirements and capital controls, were necessary.  This new-found synchronization of global politics will not fade, and will in fact be aided by the structure of capitalism itself.  Since capitalism values efficiency, anything that makes economic transactions more difficult – such as borders, differing policies, different legislation & regulations, etc. – will be fair game for phase-out or elimination.

It isn’t just economic forces that will be inducing further political unification.  As diverse peoples increasingly interact with one another due to advances in communication, transportation, and wealth, I believe that the “us” vs. “them” mentality that differentiates states will slowly fade, even if not entirely eliminated.  Increasingly, an identity as being a “citizen of the world” (cosmopolitanism) has gained some traction, with people becoming less likely to identify with the state they reside within/are formally a citizen of.  This increases the likelihood of further political globalization; as people increasingly recognize one another as fellow human beings, there will be pressure on governments to harmoniously synchronize their policies and politics to match one another.  Eventually, this could lead to a proliferation of regional supranational unions, such as the European Union, and perhaps one day a global union.  Such efforts will be further strengthened by the gradual realization that ironically, though tasked with the security and protection of their citizens, the current Westphalian nation-state system has in many ways decreased their security.  The “us” vs. “them” mentality states and state borders help to create often leads to vicious competition and/or security dilemmas (think realism and neorealism) that arguably can make the world worse off than it otherwise would be.  People may take this as an indication that a harmonization of political identities, borders, etc. is necessary.

This isn’t to say that regional or a one-world state is inevitable, or even probable (especially not in the near future). The nation-state system has been entrenched for hundreds of years now, and nationalism continues to exert strong influence (a la Russia, or even America following 9/11).  Additionally, most people (myself included) are weary of the idea of abdicating national sovereignty to a higher political entity, for multiple reasons (loss of a cherished national identity, pragmatism, religion, etc.)   Regardless, however, the forces that are shaping the world today and a widespread reevaluation of the Westphalian system will undoubtedly lead us to a new phase of political globalization and an overhaul of how states interact with one another in the future.  The question is, are we prepared to adapt?